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“General Clauses and Practice: the Use of the Principle of Good Faith in the Decisions 
of Chinese Courts” 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The principle of good faith occupies a prominent role within the context of general 
clauses already present in Chinese legislation. Although the principle was first introduced 
into the Chinese legal matrix by means of Article 4 of the 1986 General Principles of Civil 
Law, its use was rather limited, due to the strictly positivistic mindset which characterized 
the early years of post-Maoist reforms. From the 1990’s onwards, however, good faith 
began to enjoy such an increasing degree of success, both in case law and scholarly writings, 
that the principle became known as “King Clause” among Chinese scholars (帝王条款, 
diwang tiaokuan)1. 
The importance of such a principle on the declamatory plane is widely known as, at 
present, virtually every law concerning civil or commercial matters refers to the so-called 
“objective good faith” 2, while “honesty and credibility” has become almost a slogan, and is 
extensively cited by Chinese leaders as one of the prerequisites for the establishment of the 
rule of law in China3. 
                                                 
1
 See: LIANG HUIXING, “Minfa”, (Civil Law), Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1989, p. 323; ;  JIANG PING, 
“Zhonghuarenmingongheguo Hetongfa. Jingjie (fu falü tiaowen)” (Comment to The Contract Law), Beijing, 
Zhongguo Zhengfa Daxue Chubanshe, 1999, p. 6; DENG JIACHENG - HUANG ZHIPING: “Lun chengshi 
xinyong yuanze de shiyong” (“Applications of the Principle of Good Faith), Guangxi Zhengfa guanli ganbu 
Xueyuan bao, vol. 19, n. 1, January 2004, p. 32; XIA HANMING: “Chengshi xinyong yuanze qianxi” (Analysis 
of the principle of good faith), Wuhanshi jingji guanli ganbu Xueyuan xuebao, vol. 17, n. 4, December 2003, p. 
55; JIAO FUMIN: “Lun chengshi xinyong yuanze yu Woguo riandai hetongfa de chongsu” (The principle of 
good faith and the remodeling of current Chinese contract law), Hebei Faxue, vol. 20, n. 4, July 2002, p. 35;  LI 
MAOJUN: “Jiedu chengxin yuanze: guanyu chengshi xinyong yuanze de falü sikao” (Deciphering the principle 
of good faith: a legislative reflection), Hebei Faxue, vol. 20, n. 6, November 2002, p. 141. The definition is so 
common that it is included in a number of schoolbooks. See, for example, the bilingual manual ZHU YIKUN, 
“Zhonguo Minfa – China’s Civil Law”, Falü Chubanshe, 2003. p. 8. 
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 We can recall, in addition to the General Principles of Civil Law (art. 4) and the “1999 Contract Law” 
(Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hetong fa, 中华人民共和国合同法), articles 6, 42, 60, 92 e 125, which we will 
closely analyze, the following provisions: the 1993 “Law of the PRC on Protection of Consumer Rights and 
Interests” (中华人民共和国消费者权益保护法 , Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xiaofeizhe quanyi 
baohufa), article 4; the 1993 “Anti-Unfair Competition Law”, ( 反不正当竞争法 , fan buzhengdang 
jingzhengfa), article 2; the 1995 “Insurance Law” “(中华人民共和国保险法, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo 
baoxian fa), article 5; the 1997 “Price Law” (中华人民共和国价格法, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jiagefa  ), 
article 7; the 1997 “Auction Law” (中华人民共和国拍卖法, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo paimaifa), article 4; 
the 1996 “Security Law” (中华人民共和国担保法, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo danbaofa), article 3; the 2006 
Partnership Enterprise Law 中华人民共和国合伙企业法 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hehuo qiyefa), article 5; 
the 2005 Securities Law (中华人民共和国证券法 Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengquan fa) article 4, and, 
finally, the recent Labor Contract Law 中华人民共和国劳动合同法, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo laodong 
hetongfa), which entered into force on 1 January 2008, article 3. Since 2005, references to objective good faith   
(诚信 chengxin) can be found in the Arbitration Rules of China International Economic and Trade Arbitration 
Commission (“CIETAC”) (中国国际经济贸易仲裁委员会仲裁规则, Zhongguo guoji jingji maoyi zhongcai 
weiyuanhui zhongcai guice), article 7.  
3
 See the address by Wen Jiabao during his 2004 NPC press conference, cited by D. Cao: “Chinese Law. A 
Language Perspective”, 2004, note 52, p. 182. To be precise, according to reports available online, Wen Jiabao 
used the expression chengshi shouxin (诚实守信) and not the term under scrutiny in our study, chengshi xinyong 
诚实信用. Shouxin 守信 is simply the concise version of shou xinyong 守信用 = to fulfill one’s promises, 
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There are, however, aspects which are not as well known. For example, there is 
considerable uncertainty surrounding the principle in the context of judicial practice, and it 
is difficult to identify the value system triggered by the Mandarin term chengshi xinyong4 
(诚实信用) in the minds of judges or  other native Chinese speakers. 
Yet, such inquiries are vital in order to achieve a thorough understanding of Chinese 
law and the mechanisms which transcend merely formal aspects, and are all the more topical 
when placed against the extensive use of good faith and other vague notions by Chinese 
judges.  The latter investigations are further significant in light of the concerns raised by 
international observers and Chinese jurists – albeit from different perspectives – that the 
extension of the use of general clauses may lead to arbitrary judicial decisions and generate 
uncertainty in the law.  
The present paper seeks to lay out the provisional conclusions of a research project 
which is still in progress and to investigate how Chinese courts utilize the principle of good 
faith.   
To this end, we will analyze several cases which contain the term  “chengshi xinyong” 
(诚实信用), decided by the People’s Courts (at grassroots and intermediate level) between 
October 1999 and October 20065 . Particular emphasis will be placed on the good faith 
provisions contained in the 1986 General principles of Civil Law (art. 4) and 1999 Contract 
Law (articles 42, 60, 92 and 125). 
In tune with Austin’s assertion that “ a word never – well, hardly never – shakes off its 
etymology and formation. In spite of all changes in and extensions of and additions to its 
meaning, and indeed rather pervading and governing these there will persist the old idea”6, 
our discussion will begin with a brief analysis of the characters which constitute the 
expression chengshi xinyong (诚实信用), alongside an overview of the related principles 
deriving from traditional Confucian ethical theory. 
 
2. Translation of the concept of good faith in Chinese  
 
 As we have already stated, the concept of objective good faith is translated by 
means of a compound: chengshi xinyong (诚实信用). The latter expression is rather recent, 
having entered the Chinese legal fabric via the 1931 Republican Civil Code7, at the height of 
the modernization and Westernization process which began at the end of the nineteenth 
century.  
Before we embark upon our analysis of the principle of good faith in Chinese judicial 
practice, it is necessary to bear in mind that traditional Chinese law does not envisage the 
expression “chengshi xinyong”, at least insofar as its contemporary significance is concerned.  
Chengshi xinyong, similarly to other terms which have been completely absorbed in 
modern Chinese, is an example of those neologisms created between the end of the nineteenth 
                                                                                                                                                        
meaning that the two expressions can be considered semantically equivalent (D. Cao, ibid.). On the literal 
meaning of chengshi xinyong (诚实信用) see infra, paragraph 2. 
4
 For the transcription of Chinese terms we will use pinyin system, while for the transcription  of Japanese terms  
we will use the Hepburn system; in particular, we will use the Chinese and Japanese style whereby last names 
precede first names.    
5
 Source: database of the Zhongguo Fayuan Wang (中 国 法 院 网 ) website sponsored by the Supreme Court: 
http://www.chinacourt.org. 
6
 J. L. Austin, “Philosophical Papers”, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 201:  
7
 See art. 129 of the Republican Civil Code, in FOO PING SHEUNG, “Introduction, Code Civil de la 
Réapublique de Chine. Livre I, II, III”. Shanghai-Paris, 1930, and infra, paragraph 3.1. 
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and the beginning of the twentieth century, during the legal modernization phase, which was 
characterized by the introduction of legal concepts belonging to the Western legal tradition.  
The legal model chosen by Chinese reformers is the German system, filtered by the 
Japanese experience. Considering the translation of the term in question, such a choice 
appears rather evident.   
It must be pointed out that in French, as in Italian  good faith in the context of property 
acquisition and good faith in the contractual setting are expressed by using the same term. An 
adjective to qualify the term, namely, the addition of “subjective” in the first case, and 
“objective” in the second, is only inserted  when strictly necessary.  
Such an approach can be reconnected to the Code Napoléon, where the two concepts 
are not linguistically distinct, and becomes apparent when one compares Articles 1147 and 
1366 of the Italian Civil Code.  
On the other hand, German legislators, following Savigny’s teachings, attached 
different names to the two concepts. “Subjective” Good Faith is translated as “guter Glaube”, 
which is the literal translation of the latin bona fides. Objective Good Faith is expressed by 
the locution “Treu und Glauben”, “Treu” indicating “loyalty, trust” and “Glauben” indicating 
“faith, belief”, or "loyalty", which in English could be translated as fair dealing. 
The Japanese drafters, operating under German influence, followed the same 
distinction and opted for a literal translation. Thus, the  meaning of the characters is almost 
identical to the corresponding German terms. Subjective good faith is translated as “zen-i” (
善義, once again, the literal translation of “good faith”), while the expression “shingi seijitsu 
no gensoku” (信義誠実の原則) is used to describe objective good faith (literally “the duty to 
fulfill one’s promise and to be honest”). 
It must be highlighted that the distinction between French law on the one hand, and 
German and Japanese law on the other hand, is not merely linguistic. The first legal scenario 
conceives the principle of good faith as a dual acception, while the second draws a divide 
between two conceptually distinct notions: "good faith" and "fair dealing". 
The latter configuration is the one preferred by Chinese scholars, who use the same 
characters as the Japanese ones, with some negligible differences, thus yielding the terms 
“shanyi” (善意 )  and "chengshi xinyong de yuanze" (诚实信用的原则 ) .  In the latter 
context, the phrase describing  subjective good faith connotes “good intention”, while 
objective good faith is composed by “chengshi” (诚实 ) , “to be honest” and “xinyong” (信
用 ) , “being worthy of trust”, shaping an expression reflecting its Japanese equivalent. 
Given the characteristics of the Chinese language, “good faith” is a new expression 
woven into the legal vocabulary by means of characters which had previously been used to 
identify different concepts, as well as  principles unfamiliar to Western thought. By adopting 
the latter strategy the values represented by the characters were not cast aside but somehow 
blended into the imported notion. In light of Deborah Cao’s statement that “translation is a 
complex decodification and re-codification process of semiosis”, whereby “the source code 
provides the essential information to be recodified, and the target code provides the 
parameters for the re-rendering of that information”, we can infer that the redefinition of the 
concept of good faith in China stems from the characters chosen to represent it.  
The latter statement will be thoroughly assessed in the section devoted to the analysis 
of case law.  
For the time being it is sufficient to point out that Chinese authors identify a link 
between the ancient meaning and the modern significance of the term under scrutiny. In a 
large number of studies published in China on the topic (particularly in sections focusing on 
the Romanist, “foreign” origin of good faith), references to  Confucian, mohist, and legist 
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writings exalting the virtues of cheng 诚 and xin 信8 are quite common. This highlights the 
concepts’ fundamental role in Chinese philosophical and legal thinking. The expression 
“chengxin”诚信, which is the modern concise version of chengshi xinyong 诚实信用, has 
ancient roots: Chinese legal scholars9 often quote a well known passage from the Book of 
Lord Shang (商君子书, Shang jun shu, IV century B.C.), which considers  the phrase, among 
other Confucian virtues, as one of the “6 lice” leading to the weakening of the State10. There 
is further evidence of the use of such terms in other works, such as the Classic of Rites11, the 
Mencius12 or the Xunzi13.  
 Indeed, “Cheng 诚” and “xin 信 have always been considered almost synonymous: 
during the Han period, in the renowned Shuowen jiezi (说文解字, I century A.D), the most 
ancient Chinese dictionaries, one term is used to illustrate the significance of the other14.  
The connection is evident from an etymological point of view as well.  
Cheng 诚 is composed by the radical 言 (currently simplified as 讠) yan, “word”, and 
the character 成 cheng, “to accomplish”, with phonetic value15, “marking it as the wholeness 
or completeness of the person, displayed in the authenticity of his words”16 and is translated 
as “sincerity, honesty”17. Xin 信 also displays the radical “word”, 言, yan, though preceded by 
“man” ,亻 (人 ren): “the word of a man”, portraying the meaning of “truth, faith”, as well as 
the one of “letter, message”. 
If we return to the meaning of cheng 诚, we can further state that it is a nominalized 
verb, utilized in the text of the Four Confucian Books (四书, sishu) primarily for the purpose 
of identifying the human virtue of honesty, or integrity18.  
As quoted in Zhongyong 中庸 (III or II Century B.C.):19 
                                                 
8
 See, for example: ZHANG ZHONGQIU - CHEN XUECAO - WANG XIAODAN – WUJINHE: “Chengshi 
xinyong yu fa de yibanlilun chudan” (First General Theoretical Inquiry on law and good faith), Jiangsu  
Jingguan Xueyuan bao, vol. 18, n. 3, May 2003, p. 100; XIA HANMING: “Chengshi xinyong yuanze qianxi” 
(Analysis of the principle of good faith), Wuhanshi jingji guanli ganbu Xueyuan xuebao, vol. 17, n. 4, December 
2003, p. 55; HE WANGXIANG “Dui Woguo chengshi xinyong yuanze yanjiu xianzhuangde pingui” (The 
current status of research on the principle of good faith in China), in http://www.law-
lib.com/lw/lw_view.asp?no=3382, p. 4; FANG LIJUAN – ZHENG TAO: “Zhongxi chengxin lunli de zhuyao 
chayi” (Key ethical differences between the concept of good faith in China and in the West), Tianshui Xinzheng 
Xueyuan xuebao, vol. 27, n. 3 , 2004, p. 27.  
9
 See, XU GUODONG, “Minfa jiben yuanze jieshi” (Explanation of the fundamental principles of civil law), 
Beijing, Zhonguo Zhengfa Daxue chubanshe, 2001, p. 77. 
10
 J.J.L. Duyvendak (a cura di), “Il Libro del Signore di Shang”, Milano, Adelphi, 1989, p. 166 and p. 254. 
11
 Classic of Rites ( 礼 记 , Li Ji): Jitong 祭 统 , 1. An English translation is available online at: 
http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=9479&if=en 
12
 Mencius (孟子 , Mengzi): Wan Zhang shang 万章上 , 2. An English translation is available online at 
http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=1602&if=en 
13
 Xunzi (荀子, Xunzi): Xiushen 修身, 6; Bugou 不苟, 12; Wangba 王霸, 7; Zhishi 致士, 3; Qiangguo 彊国, 6. 
An English translation is available online at http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=12245&if=en. 
14
 As it surfaces when we compare the following definitions: 信：誠也。从人从言。會意。; 誠：信也。从言
成聲。See, sub vocem, Shuowen jiezi 说文解字 (comment on simple characters and analysis of complex 
characters), available online at: 
http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=26160&if=en&searchu=%E8%AF%9A. 
15
 See, contra A. C. GRAHAM, "Disputers of the Tao. Philosophical Argument in Ancient China”, Open Court, 
La Salle Illinois, 1989, pages.133-134. 
16Ibid., p.133.  
17
 See, sub vocem WU GUANGHUA (zhubian): "Chinese- English Dictionary - Hanying da cidian", Shanghai 
Jiaotongdaxue chubanshe, 1995. 
18
 A. C. GRAHAM, op. cit. 135. 
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“Integrity (诚, cheng) is the Way of Heaven, integrating is the Way of man. […] The 
man who integrates is one who chooses the good and holds on to it firmly”.20 
“Integrity (诚, cheng) is being spontaneously whole, the Way is spontaneously on 
course. […] Integrity is not only spontaneously making oneself whole, it is the means of 
making other things whole. Making oneself whole is by humanity (仁, ren), making other 
things whole is by knowledge […]”21 
We have concentrated on the previous excerpts in order to unearth the link existing 
between the concept of “cheng 诚” and “ren 仁”= “humanity, benevolence”.  
The interrelatedness of the two concepts is extremely significant in our discussion, as 
it allows us to move smoothly between the philosophical and legal planes, revealing the 
manner in which the (ethical) principles were concretely applied  in the legal practice of 
Imperial China. 
Indeed, ren 仁 (used to indicate the duty of solidarity towards individuals as well as 
the rulers’ duty to “feed the people” - yangmin 养民” ) 22 did not merely constitute one of the 
duties wise men had to comply with in accordance with the Rujia (儒家)23. The same concept, 
several centuries later captured by a number of provisions of the Qing Code, (大清律例, Da 
Qing Lü Li) in the context of contractual matters (such as loan agreements) 24 , further 
embodies one of the principles guiding the conduct of Imperial magistrates, who used the 
principle to restore the balance between contractual parties and their respective claims. 
In addition to the latter case, the Da Qing Lü Li 大清律例 regulated the relationship 
between the parties to an agreement (契约 qiyue)25 by relying on yet another principle which, 
as pointed out by Marina Timoteo, can be considered as part of “the general rules which 
shaped the history of contract law in the Western Legal Tradition”26: the duty to fulfill a 
promise, and to comply with one’s commitments.  
                                                                                                                                                        
19
 A. C. GRAHAM, op. cit. pages. 178-184 
20Zhongyong, 21, translated by Graham in A. C. GRAHAM, op. cit., p. 135. The original text is available online  
at: http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=10262&if=gb.  
21Zhongyong, 23, translated by Graham in A. C. GRAHAM, op. cit., p. 136. The original text is available online  
at:http://chinese.dsturgeon.net/text.pl?node=10262&if=gb. 
22M. TIMOTEO, "Il Contratto in Cina e Giappone nello specchio dei diritti occidentali", CEDAM, 2004, p. 46, 
Chinese characters added.  
23
 On the meaning of ren 仁 in classical Chinese philosophy see A. C. GRAHAM, op. cit., pages. 16-18,  20-21, 
26, 146, 151, 315, 350. 
24
 For a complete translation of the lü 149, see JING JUNTIAN, “Legislation Related to Civil Economy in the 
Qing Dinasty", in K. BERNHARDT- P. HUANG, “Civil Law in Qing and Repubblican China”,  Stanford 
University Press, 1994, pp. 72-73 
25The term used as a translation up to 1950’s - when it was substituted with hetong, 合同 – to identify the 
general notion of contract which entered Chinese territory only following the first contracts with the West. Up to 
that moment, and for the entire Imperial period, qiyue identified formal and binding promises, or “contracts”, 
although not always in a technical sense.  On the need to avoid excessively restrictive and culturally dependent 
interpretations see H. T. SCOGIN Jr., "Traditional Chinese Contracts and Related Documents from the Tian 
Collection (1408-1969)",  Zhonghua Book Company, Beijing, 2001 vol. 3, pages XII-XIII;  for a more detailed 
analysis on the impact of comparative law barriers on the evaluation of Chinese judicial practice see,  by the 
same author, "Civil "Law" in Traditional China: History and Theory", in K. BERNHARDT and P.HUANG ed. 
"Civil Law in Qing and Republican China, Stanford University Press, 1994, pp. 32 e ss.; on the issue of the 
transposition of legal concepts in different cultural and linguistic settings, with particular emphasis on the 
translation from/to Chinese, see J. E. AINSWORTH, "Categories and Cultures: on the "Rectification of Names" 
in Comparative Law", 82 Cornell L. Rev., 19 1996-1997. 
26M. TIMOTEO, op. cit., p. 45. 
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In this context we can return to the second set of characters, as the duty to fulfill a 
promise was considered 
“a reflection of the xin 信  virtue， entailing truthfulness and coherence in the 
fulfillment of one’s promises. Such a virtue had been linked to the fulfillment of contractual 
obligations since the Han period, identifying the idea of respect for parties’ reliance in 
contractual promises, in tune with the duty to respect the obligations imposed by one’s social 
status […]”27.  
The close connection between the moral value represented by xin 信 and contracts 
further surfaces when analyzing the etymology of the character. In addition to “trust, faith”, in 
modern Chinese the term may also be used to indicate “letter, missive, message”28, bearing in 
mind that both usages  preceded the Han dynasty.29 In the text of the Fa Yan (法言, “Words to 
live by”) xin 信 is defined as fu 符, or receipt, to identify a written document exchanged 
between the parties for evidence purposes30, which was “similar in format to the written 
contract documents of the time”31.  
Oftentimes, in the Classical period, xin 信  was used to identify agreements, or 
contracts, broadly speaking, thus merging the term’s documentary and moral significance32. 
An often cited example of such usage can be found in Confucius’ Lunyu (论语, Analects), in 
the following extract translated by James Legge:  
 “The philosopher Yu said, 'When agreements (信 xin) are made according to what is 
right (义 yi), what is spoken can be made good. When respect is shown according to what is 
proper, one keeps far from shame and disgrace. When the parties upon whom a man leans are 
proper persons to be intimate with, he can make them his guides and masters.”(Xue er 学
而， 13)33 
 In this context the allusion to yi 义 is interesting, as the term indicates justice, 
one of the virtues which is closely intertwined with xin 信. The latter statement extends to 
legal practice as well, as Imperial magistrates faced with “contractual” disputes did not 
merely assess compliance with reciprocal promises with regard to the parties’ status (or the 
parties’ “name”: father or son, ruler or government minister, to cite but a few “fundamental 
relationships” in Confucian thought). Rather, the duty to fulfill a promise, as far as 
agreements are concerned, could be cast aside in favor of a further assessment based on the 
                                                 
27M. TIMOTEO, op. cit., p. 45. 
28
 See, for example, sub vocem: ZHAO XIUYING, F. GATTI: "Dizionario compatto cinese-italiano italiano 
cinese e coversazioni", Zanichelli, 1996; or the more complete WU GUANGHUA (zhubian): "Chinese- English 
Dictionaly - Hanying da cidian", Shanghai Jiaotongdaxue chubanshe, 1995  
29
 See H.T. SCOGIN jr, "Between Heaven and Man: Contract and the State in Han Dynasty China", 63 Cal. R. 
Rev. 1325, *1379. On xin as a fundamental Confucian virtue see A. C.GRAHAM: Disputers of the Tao”, Open 
Court Publishing Company, 1989, p. 381. As is well known, the Han dynasty was sounded in 206 B.C.., and kept 
the “mandate of heaven” until 220 A.D. 
30
 H.T. SCOGIN jr., op. cit. *1379. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid.. 
33
 J. LEGGE, “The Chinese Classics”, vol. I: “Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the 
Mean”, Oxford, 1893, p. 139-40, my emphasis and characters, available online at: 
http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext03/cnfnl10u.txt. Contra see the translation Tiziana Lippiello, which 
translated xin 信 as “sincerity”, in CONFUCIUS, “I Dialoghi”, Einaudi, Torino, 2003, p. 7. 
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agreement’s compliance with morality34 , in order to deliver a judgment considered “heli 
heqing hefa 合情合理合法”, “in accordance with human feelings, reason and law”35. 
 On a final note, in order to complete our discussion on the translation of 
“objective good faith”, we must highlight that term xin 信, understood as “compliance with 
obligations undertaken by the ruler vis à vis his subjects”, played a crucial role in the legist 
school of thought, characterized by its hostility to Confucianism from almost every angle. In 
the previously cited  Book of Lord Shang (商君书, Shang jun shu, IV Century B.C.), one of 
the most prominent legist texts, it is stated that:   
 “In a State, orderly government is achieved through three things: law, good faith  (
信), and correct rules”36. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the value system described above 
underwent a gradual erosion, and was replaced by the onset of Western ideas, with a more 
radical turn from the end of the nineteenth century with the Guomindang’s seizure of power 
and the Communist Revolution. 
The imported notions, shaped by a completely different context, had the potential to 
disrupt the set of balances upon which the Confucian state had been grounded for centuries. It 
is through the emergence of such notions - and their translation process – that general clauses 
became part of the Chinese setting. 
In the following paragraphs we will investigate the process of inclusion of the good 
faith clause into the fabric of Chinese law, with particular emphasis on contract law.  
 
3. Good faith in Chinese codified law: from Article 219 of the Republican Civil Code to the 
Contract Law 
 
3.1 The introduction of the notion of good faith in China: Article 219 of the Republican Civil 
Code 
 
While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment the notion of “good faith-loyalty” 
entered Chinese borders, we can state with certainty that the notion did not appear in the draft 
civil code formulated during the last period of the Qing empire. On a formal level, its 
appearance within the principles of Chinese law can be traced Article 219 of the Republican 
Civil Code (中华民国民法 Zhonghua minguo minfa.)  
The article reads as follows:  
“ Chacun est tenu d’exécuter ses obligations et d’exercer ses droit selon les règles de 
la loyauté et de la confiance réciproque (诚实信用, chengshi xingyong)”37. 
The influence of paragraph 242 of the BGB is easily discernible. A quick glance at the 
contractual provisions of the nationalist Civil Code will suffice to detect an unmistakably 
German mark. This ought not to strike the reader, as the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch’s status as 
one of the most advanced codes of the time made it an exemplary model for the nationalist 
drafters. 
                                                 
34
 On the topic, and on Han judicial practice, see H.T. SCOGIN jr., op. cit. *1379. 
35
 Translation by Marina Timoteo. For a more detailed analysis see M. TIMOTEO, op. cit., pages. 48-49. 
36
 See J.J.L. DUYVENDAK (ed.), “Il libro del Signore di Shang”, Milano, Adelphi, 1989, p. 216. In general, on 
good faith in Chinese public law see DONG CHANGCHUN: “Chengxin – Zhongguo chuantong gongfa wenhua 
de guannian” (The concept of  “good faith” in traditional Chinese public law), Xuexi yu tansuo, vol. 148, n. 5, 
2003 
37
 HO TCHUNG-CHAN (trad.), “Code Civil de la République de Chine. Livre I, II, III”, Imprimerie de 
l’Orphelinat de T’ou-Sé-Wè, ZI-KA-WEI prés Shanghai, 1930, art. 219 (the Chinese part is my addition). 
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As opposed to their predecessors, the Guomindang legislators did not merely aim at 
the Westernization of the law: the ultimate objective was an overall modernization of the 
rules, achievable through a choice of laws which could strike a balance between modernity 
and traditional Chinese values,  as embodied by the “Three Principles of the People”.  
Though the foregoing themes will be discussed in greater depth in the section on case 
law, it is important to touch upon the instrumental use of foreign techniques only to the extent 
that they are compatible with - and functional for – the perpetuation of traditional Chinese 
values. Such an approach, which characterized Chinese attitudes towards foreign “things” for 
quite a long time, was not a novel technique: it merely constituted a revisitation of a motto 
coined during the second half of the nineteenth century by the Yangwu Movement (洋物运
动，Yangwu yundong ). The latter movement was characterized by a group of intellectuals 
who firmly believed that the motto “Chinese learning for substance; Western learning for 
application” (中学为体 ,  西学为用  zhong xue wei ti, x i  xue wei yong), constituted the 
only way to solve the country’s problems and shelter it from the aggression of the Great 
Powers.  
The concept of “good faith-loyalty” as elaborated in the BGB could be smoothly 
inserted in the context just described. On the one hand, the rule in question was firmly rooted 
in one of the most prestigious codes at the time while, on the other hand, the rule complied 
with the principle of social justice, considered one of the Three Principles of the People (三民
主义, San min zhuyi). This ensured greater flexibility as far as the notion’s introduction in the 
Chinese legal system is concerned, and further allowed for the – albeit theoretical – 
possibility to trump the will of the parties in favor of collective considerations38.  
The latter consideration is especially pertinent in the examination of the principle of 
good faith’s “collective” quality, present since its inception. By collectivity we identify a 
principle of cooperation, targeted at striking a balance between the parties to an agreement (or 
“civil activities” in general39), and between the parties and society in order to achieve fairness.  
Notwithstanding a radical ideological shift, the notion of objective good faith currently 
accepted by Chinese continental scholars reflects the foregoing considerations. 
 
3.2 The current legal scenario: good faith in the General Principles of Civil Law and Contract 
Law 
 
As is widely known, contractual good faith, exiting the realm of formal law in 1949 
alongside the Code which first recognized its existence, only reappeared forty years later, 
with the introduction the General Principles of Civil Law. 
Article 4 reads:  
“In civil activities, the principle of voluntariness (自愿原则, ziyuan yuanze), fairness 
(公平原则, gongping yuanze), making compensation for equal value (等价有偿的原则, deng 
jia you chang de yuanze), good faith (诚实信用原则, chengshi xinyong yuanze) shall (应当, 
yingdang) be observed”40. 
                                                 
38
 A part of Japanese scholarly opinion moved in such a direction in the same years, following German 
scholarship. On the issue see B. JALUZOT, op. cit. p. 50 e ss. 
39
 See Article 4 of the General Principles of Civil Law (中华人民共和国民法通则, Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo minfa tongze), 1986. 
40General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China, cap. I, art. 4, my translation. The text of the 
provision reads: 第四条 民事活动应当遵循自愿、公平、等价有偿、诚实信用的原则. 
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Good faith has thus become one of the fundamental principles (基本原则, jiben 
yuanze) of  civil law. To quote one of the most prominent Chinese civil law scholars41, such 
principles “are the starting point and basis for the formulation, explanation, implementation, 
and research of our civil law norms”42, as well as “the concentrated manifestation in the 
General Principles of China’s socialist essence”43. In the same work the author proceeds to 
clarify the significance of “good faith”: 
“Honesty and good faith mean that in civil activities the subjects of civil rights ought 
to say what they mean, be particular about reputation, scrupulously abide by promises, not 
practice trickery, not pass off second-rate goods as first quality, not damage the lawful 
interests of the state, collectives, or individuals and, according to the provisions of the law of 
contract, fulfil their civil duties. The principle of honesty and good faith also demands that at 
the time they carry out civil activities, parties respects habits and customs and society’s public 
good, not evade the law, not deliberately misinterpret contracts, not misuse rights, and not 
engage in improper competition. Upholding the principle of honesty and good faith is both the 
embodiment and requirement of our socialist spiritual civilization in civil activities” 44. 
The principle of good faith as expressed by the General Principles of Civil Law, 
therefore, is not merely aimed at regulating the relationship among the parties to an 
agreement, but, rather, seeks to weigh the interests of the subjects involved in the legal 
relationship in question against the interests of the state and society. Such a definition can be 
reconnected to our previous comments on the Guomindang legislation’s “chengshi xinyong”, 
a theme which surfaced once again in scholarly writings at the beginning of the 1990’s45. 
Following the coming into force of the General Principles, Chinese scholars began to cast 
their attention on the notion, elaborating theories on its significance and role, although, due to 
ideological reasons, in complete disregard of the fact that the principle had existed for twenty 
years.  
As far as legislation is concerned, from 1986 onwards the key civil law instruments 
refer to the concept only within the sections concerning zongze (总则), or general principles. 
In spite of the emphasis placed on “chengshi xinyong yuanze” on the formal plane, and 
because of the vagueness enveloping the laws containing the term, there is little evidence of 
its practical usage before the late 1990’s.  
 In the opinion of one scholar 46 , in the thirteen year gap between the General 
Principles of Civil Law and the 1999 Contract law, such a principle  only surfaced in 14 
                                                 
41
 TONG ROU, “The General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC: Its Birth, Characteristics, and Role, translated 
by Jonathan K. Ocko, in Law and Contemporary Problems, Spring 1989, p. 160. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 TONG ROU, op. cit., p. 162. 
45
 On the topic, see the XU GUODONG: “Minfa jiben yuanze jieshi” (Fundamental principles of civil law), 
Beijing, Zhongguo zhengfadaxue chubanshe, 1992, pages. 75-76, and: LIANG HUIXING, “Chengshi xinyong 
yuanze yu loudong buchong”, in Faxue yanjiu, n°2, 1994, p. 22; XIA ANMING; “Chengshixinyong yuanze 
qianxi” (Brief analysis of the cincept of good faith), in Wuhanshi jingji guanli ganbu xueyuanbao - Journal of 
Wuhan Economic Administration Cadre’s College, vol. 17, n°4, December 2003, p. 55 onwards; 45 DENG 
JIACHENG; HUANG ZHIPING, “ Lun chengxin yuanze de shiyong” (The applicaton of the principle of good 
faith), on “Guangxi Zhengfa guanli ganbu xueyuan bao”, Vol 19, n°1, January 2004, p. 32; also see  H. PIQUET: 
“La Chine au Carrefour des traditions juridiques, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2005, p. 239 onwards. 
46
 See CUI GUANGPING, “Hetongfa chengshixinyong yuanze bijiaoyanjiu” (Comparative study on the 
principle of good faith in the Contract Law), in Chongqing Sanxia Xueyuan xuebao, n. 1 2002, vol. 18,  
pages.84-89. 
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cases. Specifically, four cases ruled on between 1 January 1987 and April 199247, seven cases 
decided from the latter date up  to 1998 and three more cases in which the principle was 
applied without an explicit reference to relevant article48. 
Among the latter cases we must certainly mention the pifu (批复)49 n. 27/1992 of the 
People’s Supreme Court, which paved the way for subsequent developments of the principle 
of good faith in the law of contract.50.  
In the latter decision, as is well known, the People’s Supreme Court first used the 
principle of good faith to fill legislative gaps, thus establishing a link between the principle of 
“change of circumstances” (情势变更, qingshi biangeng). The relationship between the two 
principles was further elaborated by a number of notable Chinese scholars in the following 
years, yielding the conclusion that “change of circumstances” constitutes the primary example 
of the judicial application of the principle of good faith51. 
The link between the two concepts is currently so strong that it exerts an influence on 
the legislator as well. A number of commentators assert that the prominent and far-reaching 
role of the principle of good faith in the Contract Law (合同法 , Hetong fa) made the 
additional inclusion of hardship provisions within the law simply superfluous52.  
The following section will focus on the Contract Law. It must be noted that the ample 
space afforded to the notion of good faith in the latter instrument is not merely the result of 
judicial attention and development of the principle in the cited cases. 
The new Contract Law, though primarily aimed at the uniformation of a fragmented 
and intricate body of law53, further had to reconcile a set of ambitious and at times conflicting 
requirements. In particular, according to the drafters’ intentions, the instrument “[…]was to 
                                                 
47
 Source: ZUIGAORENMINFAYUAN GONGBAO BIANJIBU – EDITORIAL DEPARTMENT OF THE 
GAZETTE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, “Zuigaorenminfayuan gongbao dianxinganli quanti 
(1985.1-1992.1) – Complete collection of typical cases in the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court, Beijing: 
jingguanjiaoyu chubanshe, 1999), cited by CUI GUANGPING, “Hetongfa chengshixinyong yuanze 
bijiaoyanjiu” (Comparative study on the principle of good faith in the Contract Law), in Chongqing Sanxia 
Xueyuan xuebao, n. 1 2002, vol. 18,  p. 87. 
48
 Source: Guojia fagui shujuku – Database of national  laws and regulations, Beijing, Guojia xinxi zhongxin 
chubanshe, 1999, cited by CUI GUANPING, “Hetongfa chengshixinyong yuanze bijiaoyanjiu” (Comparative 
study on the principle of good faith in the Contract Law), in Chongqing Sanxia Xueyuan xuebao, n. 1 2002, vol. 
18,  p. 87.,  
49
 An official and written reply to a subordinate body. See, sub vocem, “Hanyin Fazi Cidian – A New Chinese-
English Law Dictionary”, Beijing, Falü Chubanshe, 2000. 
50
 The case concerned an agreement for the supply of components for gas meters, entered into when the price of 
the essential components, aluminum ingots, set by the State ranged between 4.400 and 4.600 RMB per ton. 
During the performance of the contract, following market liberalization, the price of aluminum quadrupled, 
amounting up to16.000 RMB per ton. This meant that the price of the gasmeters’ external tanks increased from 
23,085 RMB to 41 RMB per component. This was evidently a hardship case. In Chinese law, however, there 
was no provision regulating such a scenario. The Chinese Supreme Court, due to the lack of specific provisions,  
found a “change in circumstances” (情势变更, qingshi biangeng) which was “inevitable, unforeseeable, and 
caused by a third party”. For this reason, the Supreme Court ruled that requiring the supplier Company to sell the 
gas meters at the initially agreed price, would have led to an unfair result in violation of the principle of good 
faith. For an analysis of the case see CUI GUANPING, op. cit., pages. 84-89. 
51
 See ZHENG QIANG “ A Comparative Study on the Good Faith Principle of Contract Law”, 
http://www.iolaw.org.cn/en1/art2.asp., p.  2 and 4; WANG LIMING, “ Hetongfa anli jiaocheng” (The Study of 
contract law through case law), Beijing, 1999, cited by M. TIMOTEO, op. cit., p. 352. 
52
 Article 77 of the 1998 Draft, which regulated the issue was removed from the Contract Law’s final version.  
On the topic see  M. TIMOTEO, op. cit., p. 338. 
53
 See M. TIMOTEO, “Note sul processo di riforma del diritto contrattuale in Cina”, in Mondo cinese n. 98, 
1998, p. 12. 
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reflect common principles of the objective law of the current market economy, as well as 
international treaties and agreements; […] to give adequate attention to the autonomy of the 
parties; […] to suit the needs of the socialist market economy while also meeting the 
circumstances of the transition from the planned economy; […] to attend to needs of 
economic efficiency and public well-being and the facility and security of transactions”54. 
 The good faith clause contained in the legislative texts used as a model by the 
legislators sought to strike the correct balance among such - at times discordant – needs by 
incorporating moral values into issues of contractual justice.  
In light of the foregoing considerations it is not difficult to infer why the principle 
gained such an important role in the field of contract law and, similarly, why the “chengshi 
xinyong yuanze” received the title “King Clause”. 
 
3.3 Good Faith in the Contract Law 
 
As is well known, the coming into force of the Contract Law marked a turning point 
for the usage of the concept of good faith in China, simultaneously raising international 
uneasiness over the possible uses of the principle by Chinese courts.55 The latter concerns are 
somewhat perplexing, given that “chengshi xinyong” had been one of the fundamental 
principles of Chinese civil law for at least 10 years, and had been consistently cited in the vast 
majority of civil laws56. 
Moreover, it is evident that no other law in the People’s Republic of China had placed 
such prominence on the principle. The Contract Law incorporates the phrase in 5 articles, 
while in two other articles we can detect the term used to indicate subjective good faith (善意, 
shanyi)57, and the term “bad faith” (恶意, e’yi) is referred to in three other articles58. 
Indeed, during the drafting phase, two different schools of thought emerged in 
connection with the issue of general clauses59. As to the first school, its promoters endorsed 
the Minfa Tongze as a model for the new text, thus calling for the enumeration and definition 
of fundamental principles in one or more articles. The supporters of the second school, on the 
other hand, advocated a reflection of the basic principles “through” the law, in order to inject 
them with a degree of concreteness. As far as the principle of good faith is concerned, the 
latter approach appears to be the preferred one.  
After all, such an approach is shared by one of the texts which greatly inspired 
Chinese legislators, namely the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts 60. 
This provided two advantages: the possibility of harmonizing Chinese contract law with 
                                                 
54
 “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hetongfa lifa fang’an”  1995, cited by P. POTTER : “The Chinese Legal 
System: Globalisation and Local Legal Culture”, London & New York, Routledge Studies on China in 
Transition 2001, p. 40. 
55
 See, for example, R. PEEREMBOOM, “A Missed Opportunity? China’s New Contract Law Fails to Address 
Foreign Technology Providers’ Concerns”, in China Law & Practice, May 1999, vol. 13, n° 4.  The same 
concerns are expressed by Potter, in P. POTTER., op. cit., p.43. 
56
 For example, “Law on Technology Transfer Contracts” Articles 4 and 14. 
57
 Articles 47 and 48. The articles are outside the scope of the present study, which focuses on objective good 
faith. 
58
 Articles 42,(1), 52(2) and 59. The issue will not be explored in the current discussion.   
59
 The data is reported in “An Insider’s Guide to the RPC Contract Law”, Asia Law and Practice, 1999. 
60On the influence of the UNIDROIT Principles on the drafting of the Contract Law see ZHANG YUQING, 
HUANG DANHAN, “The New Contract Law in the People’s Republic of China and the UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts: A Brief Comparison” , in 
www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/contents/2000.htm.  
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international commercial customs, while at the same time granting ample space to a clause 
deemed fundamental in order to guarantee justice and fairness in contractual relationships61. 
Thus, the articles dedicated to good faith in the Contract Law call to mind similar 
provisions contained in the Principles, at least insofar as the ‘spirit’ of the text is concerned, 
rather than the actual formulation62. In tune with the Unidroit model, the drafters inserted 
reference to “honesty and credibility” in almost every Chapter of the section devoted to 
“General Principles”, and in particular: 
1) Chapter I, “General Provisions”, article 6, previously cited63; 
2) Chapter II, “Formation of Contracts”, article 42, point 364; 
3) Chapter IV, “Performance of Contracts”, article  60, second 
paragraph65; 
4) Chapter VI, “Discharge of Contractual Rights and Obligations”, article 
9266; 
5) Chapter VIII, “Other Provisions”, article 125, first paragraph67. 
The principle of good faith thus warrants application in every stage of contractual 
activity, from formation to termination, via performance and interpretation.  
At the time of the law’s entry into force, such provisions did not merely enter new 
territory with regard to their reference to the principle of good faith, but sought to regulate 
legal scenarios which had been previously disregarded by Chinese law. For example, previous 
contract laws did not provide for the concept of culpa in contrahendo68. In the same vein, the 
People’s Republic had never witnessed the existence of laws regulating the interpretation of 
contracts. The incorporation of such provisions in the new law can thus be considered “a great 
leap forward for Chinese contract law”69.  
Through the Hetong fa, good faith is no longer merely envisaged as a useful tool for 
the adaptation or termination of a contract in the event of unforeseeable and inevitable 
circumstances, but the key to unraveling the entire contractual system. 
                                                 
61
 WANG LIMING, “Tongyi Hetongfa zhidingzhong de ruogan yinan wenti de tantao” (Investigation on the 
difficulties encountered while drafting the Contract Law), Shang, in Zhengfa luntan, n° 4, 1996. 
62
 See ZHANG YUQING, HUANG DANHAN, op. cit. 
63
 “The parties shall abide by the principle of good faith in exercising their rights and performing their 
obligations.”. 
64
 “Where in the course of concluding a contract, a party engaged in any of the following conducts, thereby 
causing loss to the other party, it shall be liable for damages: (i) negotiating in bad faith under the pretext of 
concluding a contract; (ii) intentionally concealing a material fact relating to the conclusion of the contract or 
supplying false information; (iii) any other conduct which violates the principle of good faith.”. 
65
“The parties shall fully perform their respective obligations in accordance with the contract. The parties shall 
abide by the principle of good faith, and perform obligations such as notification, assistance, and confidentiality, 
etc. in light of the nature and purpose of the contract and in accordance with the relevant usage”. 
66
 “Upon discharge of the rights and obligations under a contract, the parties shall abide by the principle of good 
faith and perform obligations such as notification, assistance and confidentiality, etc. in accordance with the 
relevant usage.”. 
67
“In case of any dispute between the parties concerning the construction of a contract term, the true meaning 
thereof shall be determined according to the words and sentences used in the contract, the relevant provisions 
and the purpose of the contract, and in accordance with the relevant usage and the principle of good faith.”.  
68
 ZHANG YUQING, HUANG DANHAN, “The New Contract Law in the People’s Republic of China and the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts: A Brief Comparison” , in 
www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/contents/2000.htm. 
69
 On the point, see ZHANG YUQING, HUANG DANHAN, op. cit. 
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The notion of good faith has therefore become, as defined by Chinese scholars, the 
“King Clause”70. We will now proceed to assess the principle’s practical significance through 
the analysis of a number of cases deemed emblematic by the People’s Supreme Court. 
 
4. Application of the principle of good faith in case law (1999 – 2006) 
 
During the 1990’s the principle of good faith underwent a progressive expansion and, 
in tune with the growing attention by scholars and legislators, the application of “chengshi 
xinyong” in legal practice increased considerably.   
During a first phase urban courts, generally associated with the highest professional 
level, turned their attention to the possibilities provided by the principle. Currently, the usage 
of the good faith clause is rather  generalized, and often appears in the context of cases 
decided by the Local People’s Court at every level, not merely in the contractual arena. 
The analysis which follows focuses on documents which raise the principle of good 
faith present in the “Collected Cases” section (案件库, anjian ku) of the Supreme Court’s 
website Zhongguo fayuan wang (中国法院网 , Chinacourt net)71.  
The material under scrutiny is rather heterogeneous as to form and content: the cases 
grouped under the heading “chengshi xinyong” amounted to 350 by the end of 2006, and 
covered a vast array of issues. In our investigation we will primarily address cases concerning 
contract law. 
We will begin by analyzing a number of examples of culpa in contrahendo, 
highlighting the fact that the application of the principle of good faith in this context is rather 
frequent in China, covering approximately half of the cases in the contractual remit.  
 
4.2 Application of the principle of good faith in case law: contract - culpa in 
contrahendo (art. 42 Contract Law) 
 
As is widely known, legal systems which extend the notion of good faith to the 
precontractual phase normally give effect to the principle when withdrawal from negotiations 
arises under particular circumstances which had generated legitimate expectations as to the 
conclusion of the contract72. In order to asses whether or not a certain issue falls within the 
scope of Article 42 of the Contract Law73, Chinese judges adopt a similar approach, as we 
will see in the case which follows74. 
Having decided to open a pharmacy, a company signed a letter of intent for the 
employment of Mr. Liu, defining the latter’s role and tasks to be performed in the pharmacy. 
                                                 
70
 See supra, note 1. 
71
 http://www.chinacourt.org. The website incorporates information which is otherwise rather hard to obtain, 
such as the recent documents published by the Supreme Court or the full text of judgments of certain typical 
cases decided by Chinese courts. In addition, the website includes opinions by Supreme Justices, information on 
the courts, and judicial clarifications. An English version of the website can be found at http://en.chinacourt.org, 
but it is not as complete and updated. 
72
 See P. VAN OMMESLAGE,  I. La bonne foi dans le relation entre particuliers – A. – dans la formation du 
contrat – Rapport general , in TRAVAUX DE L’ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT DES AMIS DE LA 
CULTURE JURIDIQUE FRANÇAISE (Journées louisianaises), Tome XLIII, Paris, Libraire de la Cour de 
Cassation, 1992, p. 33. 
73
 On this article, see in detail supra, paragraph 3.3. 
74
 See 从本案谈违反诚信原则的司法判断  (Cong ben’an tang weifan chengxin yuanze de sifa panduan), 
source : Zhongguo Fayuan Wang (www.chinacourt.org/ajdq/), visited on 05/04/2007  
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The letter, however, failed to specify details such as remuneration and starting date, details 
which were left to be identified in the employment contract. 
 Following the signature of the letter of intent, the company identified the premises for 
the pharmacy and obtained the necessary licenses while Liu, as agreed, set out to obtain his 
certification as a pharmacist. However, following a number of attempts and mediation by 
competent authorities, the negotiating parties failed to agree on the issues left undefined, 
particularly the remuneration aspect and the duration of the employment. Asserting bad faith 
on the part of the company, Liu withdrew from the negotiations, forcing the company to find 
another pharmacist, thus delaying the pharmacy’s opening. The company sued Liu, seeking 
the reimbursement of incurred expenditures (Liu’s training, certification fees, and medical 
expenses) as well as for the losses associated with the delayed opening.  
The Nantong Intermediate Court (Jiangsu), ruled against the plaintiff. The Court held 
that the letter of intent did not constitute a valid employment contract, and thus did not 
produce contractual obligations, as it lacked the essential elements for the creation of an 
employment relationship, such as duration and remuneration. The defendant merely exercised 
his freedom to contract, formulated “reasonable requests” (合理, heli), and withdrew from 
negotiations following the failure to reach an agreement. The defendant’s conduct was not 
found to be in violation of the principle of good faith and did not give rise to precontractual 
liability.  
It is interesting to follow the Court’s reasoning, as it discloses an approach which 
resembles our perspective. Indeed, in Italy, withdrawal from transactions, regulated by Article 
1337 of the Italian Civil Code is not legitimate when 1) there is a “reasonable” expectation by 
the plaintiff that the contract will be concluded and 2) it is impossible for the defendant to 
“reasonably” justify his behavior75.  
The Chinese judge adopted an analogous test, with one further addition: in the 
assessment of the reasonableness of the parties’ claims, the yardstick was not merely the 
balancing of interests between the negotiating parties, but the potential impact on society at 
large. 
As previously underlined76, Chinese legal scholarship defines the principle of good 
faith as a duty to strike a balance between individual interests and the interests of society. The 
judges assessed Liu’s behavior in light of such a definition, yielding the following conclusion: 
Liu was entitled to withdraw from negotiations as he was simply exercising his right to 
choose his occupation and receive remuneration. The losses incurred by the company can be 
considered a normal business risk, and requiring Liu to fulfill the other party’s expectations 
would entail not only a violation of the defendant’s rights, but would “harm the interests of 
society”. On these bases the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. 
 Another duty which is typically associated with good faith during negotiation is the 
duty of information. Pursuant to Article 42 of the Contract Law, a negotiating party cannot 
deliberately conceal important facts concerning the conclusion of the contract or intentionally 
provide false information. The latter instance constitutes a rather typical field of application of 
the principle of good faith in China. This is especially true in the field of consumer contracts. 
Generally, in the event of misrepresentation or concealed information by a seller 
towards and uninformed or inexperienced buyer, a contract cannot be considered valid, and 
                                                 
75R. SACCO, “I. La bonne foi dans le relation entre particuliers – A. – dans la formation du contrat – Rapport 
italien , in TRAVAUX DE L’ASSOCIATION HENRI CAPITANT DES AMIS DE LA CULTURE 
JURIDIQUE FRANÇAISE (Journées louisianaises), Tome XLIII, Paris, Libraire de la Cour de Cassation, 1992, 
pag. 137. 
76
 See supra, note 47. 
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the normal form of redress is the restitution of the goods to the seller at the price paid by the 
buyer77 . However, Chinese judges occasionally take one step further and do not merely 
compensate the victim for the so-called “negative interests”, or losses incurred78, but take into 
account “positive” interests as well, namely the benefits the victim would have enjoyed had 
the contract been considered valid.  
In this regard, let us consider a case decided by the People’s Court of Xiling district, 
city of Yichang (Hubei), case number 497/200479.  
On 23 November 2001 Wang Kenian entered into a life insurance contract on behalf 
of her husband Qu Haiqing, with the Yichang branch of the “Tai Kang Life Insurance 
Company”, designating her son Qu Yuhua as the beneficiary. The same day Wang Kenian 
paid the stipulated premium (1480,20 RMB), and on November 29 the policy was issued by 
the Company. On 4 October 2002 the husband died, and on October 29 Wang Kenian 
requested the payment of the insured amount (30.000 RMB). On November 20 the insurance 
company replied that the contract could not be deemed valid, as the policy had not been 
underwritten by the insured, the policy owner being Wang Kenian.  
Wang Kenian and Qu Yuhua initiate proceedings against the insurance Company, 
claiming that such a requirement had not been highlighted by the insurer during negotiations, 
and that in any event the Company accepted the payment of the premium. Thus, the plaintiffs 
sought the award of damages on the basis of the Company’s liability for culpa in 
contrahendo.  
During the trial before the People’s Court of Xiling district, city of Yichang (Hubei), 
the Company expressed its intention to only compensate the premium. The trial court found 
that the insurance contract clearly stated that both the policy owner and the insured had to 
sign the policy, and that failure to comply with such a requirement would result in invalidity. 
It was therefore held that the insurance company had adequately fulfilled its duty to inform, 
and the  plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed (case number 273, 2003). 
The appellate court, Intermediate People’s Court of Yichang took a different angle on 
the facts. The court found that the insurance Company had been well aware of the invalidity 
of the agreement from the outset. Indeed, the insurer had filled out the policy forms on behalf 
of Wang Kenian, and could not have been unaware of the insured’s absence. The appeal was 
thus allowed, and the case was remanded to the Trial Court for reexamination.  
On remand, the trial court ruled that the insurance company was liable for the 
invalidity of the contract. Although an insurance agent was present to oversee the signature 
process, the Company did not adequately fulfill its duty to inform, as it did not specify the 
consequences of the insured’s failure to underwrite the agreement. Pursuant to Article 61, 
section 1, of the General Principles, and Article 42, point 2, of the Contract Law, the Court 
enforced the life insurance contract, awarding damages of 30.000 RMB, a sum equal to the 
policy’s settlement in the event of death.  
The ruling is extremely significant, especially from a Western perspective, and gained 
an exemplary status in China as well. In the Comment to the case published on Zhongguo 
Fayuan Wang, the judge clarified that one of the fundamental considerations underlying the 
ruling was the “common sense of social fairness”, as well as the need to halt such behavior by 
insurance companies, which was rather frequent at the time.  
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 G. AJANI, A. SERAFINO, M. TIMOTEO, op. cit., p. 344. 
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 For the application in Italian law see R. SACCO, op. cit., p. 139 
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The application of the duty to inform in accordance with good faith has not, however, 
always yielded such clear cut results. The reasonableness criterion  (合理, heli) - a vague term 
which is not incorporated within the realm of general clauses, and has always been part of the 
Chinese tradition 80  - is a useful tool to moderate excessive requests by victims of 
misrepresentation. 
The Guangzhou Ribao (Guangzhou Daily) reported the case concerning Miss Zhou81, 
who applied for a loan with the Huangpu branch of a bank to purchase real estate for the 
purposes of setting up a business. To this end, in December 1998 Miss Zhou entered into a ten 
year mortgage agreement for an amount of 4.540.000 yuan, agreeing to repay the loan capital 
and interest via fixed rate monthly installments. In 2003, while reading a newspaper, Miss 
Zhou learned about a different repayment arrangement involving an adjustable rate, or 
"progressive reduction of the payment" (递减还款法, dijian huankuan fa), which according 
to her calculations would save her 10.000 in interest.  
Arguing that, at the moment of the conclusion of the contract, the Bank had acted in 
bad faith in failing to mention the other payment option, Miss Zhou initiated proceedings. The 
plaintiff sought the recalculation of her mortgage in accordance with the second option, and 
called for the refund of interest accrued up to that point (August 2003), amounting to 7.000 
RMB. 
The trial court rejected the plaintiff’s claims, due to insufficient factual and legal 
groundings. The decision was reversed on appeal. The appellate Court ruled that the Bank 
was bound by “additional obligations” of good faith and reasonable (合理, heli) information 
and, due to the Bank’s “privileged position vis à vis the client”, information on possible 
alternatives had to be provided. Yet, Miss Zhou’s position was deemed "bu heli" (不合理), 
not very reasonable, as it only took into account the higher interest rates of the “fixed rate” 
payment scheme, while ignoring the fact that the installments paid in accordance with the first 
method were lower than the installments initially required by the adjustable rate. 
The case has not yet obtained a final ruling, and Miss Zhou requested that the People’s 
Procuratorate of Guangzhou reconsider her case through the zai shen procedure (再审 , 
literally: judge again)82. 
 
4.3 Application of the principle of good faith in case law: contracts - Performance 
and Interpretation (Articles 60 and 125 of the Contract Law) 
 
Among the various definitions used to describe the expression “good faith” the most 
common one is certainly the idea of “loyalty”. In the Chinese setting, the latter implication is 
made obvious by the choice of characters used to translate it: xin (信), as we have seen, 
identified the duty to fulfill a promise83. Perhaps this helps explain why Chinese judges often 
turn to the principle of good faith in the context of performance of contracts, when one of the 
parties fails to comply with his or her contractual obligations.  
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An emblematic illustration is the case involving Xin Wenguo and Su Guangjin84.  
Xin and Su are old friends. On 20 May 2004, Su was arrested by order of the People’s 
Court of Ningcheng County (Inner Mongolia), on the ground that he had failed to return a 
loan of 6000 RMB. Not knowing whom to contact, Su asked his family to request Xin 
Wenguo’s help. Xin collected the required amount and delivered it to the Court. Upon his 
release, Su drafted a “qiantiao”  欠条85, promising to return the amount within one month. 
After that, he disappeared. 
 The Court, having confirmed the existence of the loan and the failed payment, ruled 
that Su Guanjing acted in a manner contrary to good faith  in violation of Article 60 of the 
Law of Contract and ordered the repayment of the 6000 yuan.  
The solution offered by the first paragraph of Article 6086, as relied on in the ruling, is 
certainly not innovative. The second paragraph of the same article, as we have previously 
discussed87, uses the principle of good faith as the yardstick to identify the reciprocal duties 
among the parties, thus allowing for the introduction of the so-called “additional obligations” 
(附随义务，fusui yiwu), paving the way for new interpretative avenues88. 
The application of this provision is currently rather frequent and is used, for example, 
to regulate the conduct of parties who, deceptively, merely perform what is strictly provided 
by a literal reading of the contract.  
The two cases which follow aptly summarize the foregoing considerations.  
Mr. Shen89 purchased an apartment and hired a well-known company to renovate the 
premises, by means of a “baogong baoliao” contract (包工包料 , lliterally: “work and 
materials included”). Half way though the renovation Shen ordered a centralized air 
conditioning system made up of five appliances which were installed by the manufacturer. 
Due to poor coordination between the air conditioning company and the renovator, the air 
conditioner’s exhaust pipe installed under the apartment’s floor was not integrated with the 
building’s plumbing system. The Summer of  2006 was particularly hot and the air 
conditioner was permanently in use. For this reason the air conditioner’s pipe was insufficient 
to drain the large amounts of water which ultimately flooded the apartment. The renovating 
company argued that the contract did not explicitly mention air conditioning systems, and 
thus refused to compensate Shen, who promptly initiated proceedings against the company. 
The People’s Court of Qingpu district (Shanghai), ruled that, by virtue of the principle of 
good faith, the defendant was not merely bound to perform the services explicitly provided 
for by the agreement, but related services as well. In the present case, the defendant Company 
ought to have coordinated its efforts with the air conditioning company in order to connect the 
drainage pipe to the bathroom drain. The Court found the renovating Company liable for 50% 
of the damage caused to the property and ordered compensation amounting to 10.000 yuan.   
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The duty to act in good faith also implies that a party not disclose to third parties the 
counterpart’s commercial secrets learned during the performance of the contract.  
In recent years disputes between companies and former employees on the basis of 
violations of commercial secrets have increased considerably. A recent case90 on this matter, 
alongside other 9 leading cases91 has been recently published by the Law and Regulation 
Section of the Intellectual Property Department of the Guangdong Province.  
On 14 April 2000 Mr. Lu was hired by the Huashen Dashi Company as a sales 
manager. At the moment of his employment Lu signed a “confidentiality agreement” 
undertaking, for the duration of his employment,  not to perform his services for other 
companies manufacturing the same goods or providing similar services, further agreeing not 
to perform such activities independently. On 26 December 2003 Lu terminated his 
employment with the Company.  
In the month of June the same year Lu set up a company called Saifei, which 
established a professional relationship with another company, Hong Fujin, performing 
services which had previously been provided by Huashen. This occurred in July, when Lu 
was still a Huashen employee. Thus, Huashen sued Lu’s Company, seeking to halt the 
violation of commercial secrets and receive compensation for the losses incurred, further 
requesting a public apology.  
The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff, and the ruling was subsequently upheld 
on appeal.  
In the opinion of Liu Zaidong, head of the Law and Regulation Section of the 
Intellectual Property Department who compiled the cases for publication, the case just 
described raised the delicate question of balancing the interests of the company and the 
individual’s freedom to seek employment. Lu set up his Company while still being employed 
by  Huashen, consequently violating the confidentiality agreement and Article 10 of the Anti-
Unfair Competition Law. In the commentary to the case, Liu Zaidong further commented that 
“[…] in employment relationship every person must comply with the principle of good faith, 
take into account the Company’s rights as well as individual rights, and enjoy the right to 
choose an occupation within the limits prescribed by law, without causing harm to other 
individuals”.  
 
4.4 Application of the principle of good faith in case law: contracts – post-contractual 
liability (Contract Law, article 92). 
 
 As stated in the previous section, pursuant to Article 92 of the Contract Law, 
the principle of good faith is binding upon the parties even after the termination of the 
contractual relationship, prescribing “obligations such as notification, assistance and 
confidentiality, etc. in accordance with the relevant usage.”92. 
 The cases concerning the issue reveal little propensity by Chinese judges to 
apply such a provision. In the website used there is only one case raising post-contractual 
liability issues using the “chengshi xinyong” formula. Moreover, the case is incorporated in a 
document aimed at explaining the meaning of “post-contractual liability” (后合同义务，
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houhetong yiwu) to Chinese judges93, drafted by a member of the Political Department of the 
People’s Supreme Court. 
 The same author explains the need for a clarification of the issue in the 
following terms: “the Principles do not mention the expression “post-contractual obligations”, 
and scholarly writings do not place much emphasis on it, meaning that there is no single, 
coherent definition or application by the judges”. In order to shed light on this situation the 
author analyzes the following case on post-contractual liability. 
In January 2000 Liu accepted the position as South East Asia Manager with the 
import-export company Xinya, owned by Lugang. The duration of the contract was agreed to 
be 3 years, during the course of which Liu was expected to manage marketing channels for 
South East Asia, client portfolios, and other important information. After three years Liu set 
up a clothing company in the same city using the marketing channels, client portfolios, and 
information obtained at Xinya. In May 2003 Xinya initiated proceedings against Liu, who 
argued that, following its termination, the contract no longer has binding force.  
The foregoing analysis does not merely touch upon theoretical aspects, such as the 
characteristics of “post-contractual obligations” or their content. Rather, the case is instructive 
because of its practical ramifications: it lists the necessary elements a judge will have to bear 
in mind when assessing the existence of post-contractual liability,and provides a guide for the 
quantification of damages. In finding in favor of the plaintiff, the judge in the case under 
scrutiny held that Liu unequivocally violated his duty of confidentiality, which survives the 
termination of the contract. 
 
4.5 Application of the principle of good faith in case law: burden of proof 
 
The vague content of the good faith formula entails great flexibility, and the concept is 
often shaped in accordance with different factual requirements and legislative gaps which 
must be filled.   
It is for this reason that Chinese judges often turn to the principle of good faith in 
order to interpret the intentions of the legislator when the latter is silent on a specific issue. An 
emblematic example involves the use of the principle to determine the burden of proof in the 
event of uncertainty.  
Scholarly opinion appears to favor such an approach: Zhang Junyan, of the Renmin 
Daxue (People’s University), explained in a 2002 article94 that in the evaluation of the burden 
of proof,  
“in the event of explicit provisions the judges must follow the law; if such provisions 
are lacking the so-called “rules of experience” apply; in the absence of both, the burden of 
proof must be determined on the basis of the principles of equity and good faith, in order to 
avoid arbitrary results”95. 
The possibility by a judge to shift the burden of proof in accordance with the principle 
of good faith is explicitly provided for by article 7 of the  “Regulations on Evidence in Civil 
Proceedings” (关于民事诉讼证据的若干规定，Guanyu minfa susong zhengjude ruogan 
guiding) issued by the Supreme People’s Court on 9 November 2003. 
The article reads as follows: 
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“In  the event that the present Regulations, existing provisions, and judicial 
interpretations cannot be adapted to a given legal question in order to determine the burden of 
proof, the People’s Court ought to base the determination on the principles of good faith and 
fairness, as well as the parties’ evidentiary competence”96. 
The People’s Court of Pengzhou applied the provision in a case involving a dispute 
between  two companies, Henda (Pengzhou, Sichuan) and the Pengzhou (Sichuan) branch of 
the Salt industry in Sichuan97. The first company, a manufacturer of pickled goods, entered 
into a supply agreement with the Pengzhou branch of the Sichuan Salt Industry for the 
provision of salt to be used for pickling purposes. In November 2001, the plaintiff purchased 
224,6 tons of plain salt from the defendant company. However, 135 tons of the said supply 
were actually iodized salt which had been in storage so long that the supplier company 
alleged all the iodine had volatized. The plaintiff company used the latter supply to produce 
pickled vegetables, but the vegetables deteriorated, causing the plaintiff to suffer significant 
losses. The plaintiff company sought damages to compensate for the losses incurred. The 
defendant argued that there was no connection between the salt supply and the harm suffered 
by the counterpart. During the trial, the parties failed to establish a correlation between use of 
iodized salt and the deterioration of the vegetables. Thus, the burden of proof had to be placed 
on one of the parties.  
Given the absence of specific provisions the People’s Court of Pengzhou, relied on 
article 7 of the Supreme Court’s “Regulations on Evidence in Civil Proceedings”  and the 
principle of good faith to rule that the burden of proof rested on the plaintiff Company. As the 
evidence submitted by Henda was inconclusive as to the facts upon which the claim was 
founded, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim, by virtue of Article 2 of the “Regulations 
on Evidence in Civil Proceedings”98. 
Upon closer examination the judge’s rationale does not appear to be perfectly clear: 
one may wonder why, in the present situation, the judge felt the need to “strengthen” Article 2 
of the Regulations (similar to Article 2697 of the Italian Civil Code) by adding a reference to 
good faith and fairness.  
The judge’s explanation surfaces in the commentary to the case, which states that 
reliance on such principles was warranted by the numerous lacunae affecting Chinese law, 
due essentially to the absence of a civil code.   
The significance of the role of good faith in the assignment of the burden of proof and 
the different solutions adopted by Chinese judges is illustrated by the following case99. 
In the commentary to the case, the judge defined it as “a practical lesson on the 
determination of the burden of proof in cases involving the quality of commercial products”. 
On 1 January 2004 Zhang Zhiqiang purchased a refrigerator from the Suning 
Company for a price of 1600 yuan. The refrigerator did not work correctly and Sunin’s 
technicians attempted to repair it twice, with no success. On 24 July 2004 the manufacturer 
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decided to replace the appliance.  The employee in charge of transportation delivers the 
replacement refrigerator to Zhang’s apartment, though Zhang is not present at the time of 
delivery. The fridge is delivered without its original packaging and with no instruction manual 
and without  the "3 guarantees" (repair, replacement and refund in the event of defective 
products). Upon his return Zhang realizes that the refrigerator’s surface is covered in mold 
and concludes that the appliance is not new. Despite numerous complaints lodged by Zhang 
no agreement is reached with the Company. On 16 September 2004 Zhang sued Suning for 
damages, requesting  3320 yuan (1600 yuan paid for the appliance, 1600 yuan as 
compensation and 120 yuan for legal fees).  
The People’s Court of Quanshan district (Xuzhou, Jiangsu) immediately faced the 
difficulty by the parties to provide evidence on whether or not the refrigerator was new. The 
court ruled that Sunling’s evidentiary competence was greater because, due to its 
specialization in the production of electrical appliances, the company was in a better position 
to   demonstrate that the refrigerator was in  fact a new appliance. Thus, the burden of proof 
was placed on Sunling, also considering the principles of good faith and fairness towards the 
consumer. The Court found in favor of the plaintiff, with minor changes as to the 
quantification of damages.  
On appeal, the Intermediate People’s Court of Xuzhou also placed considerable 
emphasis on the allocation of the burden of proof. Yet, as the facts did not perfectly fit one of 
the eight scenarios envisaged by Article 4 of the “Regulations on Evidence in Civil 
Proceedings”, the Court rule that the burden of proof rested on the appellee (plaintiff at the 
trial stage). The appellate judgment, therefore, upheld the Quanshan Court’s ruling as to the 
restitution of the goods at the paid price, but did not award Zhang  Zhiqiang any damages.  
Zhang Zhiqian applied for a zaishen, or new trial, arguing that the appellate court had 
erroneously allocated the burden of proof.  Indeed, in light of the principle of good faith, as 
prescribed by Article 7 of the “Regulations on Evidence in Civil Proceedings”100, the onus 
should rest on the manufacturer and not on the consumer.   
 The Intermediate People’s Court of Xuzhou ruled that the appellate court did not 
place the burden of proof on the correct party and consequently overturned its decision. The 
case just described is yet another example of the use of principle of good faith to restore the 
balance between the parties, in order to avoid that one party take advantage of its privileged 
position to the detriment of the weaker party. Reliance on such a principle is perfectly 
reflective of Socialist calls for “solidarity” while, at the same time, recalling principles of 
humanity and justice101. 
The author of the comment asserted, perhaps with excessive emphasis, that the judicial 
solution “is not merely compatible with a common sense of justice, but reflects a refined 
judicial technique and strikes the perfect balance between law and society”. 
For our purposes it is relevant to note that the achievement of legal certainly, at least 
as far as the present legal field is concerned, still lies at quite a distance.   
 
 
5. Conclusions. 
 
At the present stage in our research it is not yet possible to provide specific data 
concerning the role of the principle of good faith in the judicial practice of the People’s 
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Republic of China. However, the cases analyzed in our discussion can help isolate themes 
for further reflection.  
First of all, the cases allow us to reconsider a number of clichés in connection with the 
use of vague notions in Chinese legislation which permeate Western literature. We observed 
how foreign spectators look upon the use of general clauses by Chinese judges with a degree 
of suspicion, as they fear that the extension of the notions’ scope and application range may 
lead to arbitrary judgments and uncertainly in the law.  
In light of the cases analyzed thus far it is evident that such concerns can be placed 
into perspective. On the one hand the lack of foreseeability and stability may indeed raise 
some concerns with regard to the principle of good faith, as we have seen when discussing 
the burden of proof.102 Yet, the use of the notion does not appear to leave much room for 
judicial arbitrariness or prompt unreasonable rulings. On the contrary, in various judicial 
opinions the Chinese term indicating “reasonableness” (合理 heli) often goes hand in hand 
with “good faith”. 
Moreover, even Socialist interpretations of the good faith clause have not yielded 
particularly original solutions. This is the same conclusion reached in the past by illustrious 
Italian scholars in connection with the application of general clauses by Yugoslav judges or 
judges from other  Socialist legal systems103.  
What surfaces from a close reading of the Zhongguo Fayuan Wang (中国法院网) 
cases is a residual use of the good faith clause, in perfect harmony with legal scholarship 
and the Supreme Court’s recommendations. Judges are advised to avail themselves of the 
principle of good faith only in the absence of legal provisions or “rules of experience” (经验
法则，jinyan faze) explicitly governing the situation, and in any event in accordance with 
judicial interpretations of higher courts. 
On this note we can point out that Zhongguo Fayuan Wang is a website sponsored 
by the Supreme Court itself, and clearly the Court has no interest in promoting opinions 
which clash with the “correct” usage of the principle, especially in light of the instructive 
role of case law brought by the publication of judgments in recent years.  
One tendency we can detect is the propensity to use the good faith formula as a 
yardstick, and although the concept is rooted in the Western legal tradition, it is placed 
alongside traditional Chinese criteria, such as “reasonableness” (合理, heli), or “fairness” 
(公平, gongping). 
If we consider the declamations of Chinese legal scholars and legislators we find that 
the usage of good faith ought to infuse civil relationships with “morality”, through the 
establishment of the “honest businessman criterion” (诚实商人的道德标准 , chengshi 
shangren de daode biaozhun) and the “balancing” (平衡, pingheng) exercise among the 
interests of individuals and society. If we move beyond such declamations it surfaces that, in 
practice, the concept is frequently used to achieve the ends of “justice” in specific cases, 
generating solutions somehow evoking the Imperial Magistrates’ decisions based on 
Confucian principles.  
Indeed, Chinese scholars draw a link between the notion of good faith and the 
Confucian tradition, at least on a etymological level104. 
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As we have seen, such remarks are made almost fleetingly, and are usually 
immediately followed by allusions to the notion’s Romanist origins and its development in 
Western legal systems. In the course of our discussion we emphasized how the principle’s 
“legislative success” and its incorporation in the Contract Law have been influenced by the 
(Western) models adopted by Chinese legislator105, and the use of the notion in judicial 
contexts can be considered consistent with judicial practice in several countries belonging to 
the Western Legal Tradition.  
It is still safe to state that, in several cases, the application of rules borrowed from 
Romano-Germanic legal culture almost seems to mirror solutions developed within the 
Chinese tradition. We have discussed several examples in the field of contracts, such as the 
establishment of the terms of an agreement (good faith as “xin” 信, to fulfill an agreement), 
or the modification of a contract on the basis of “honesty and credibility” (诚实信用
chengshi xinyong) in order to protect the interests of the weaker party, as in consumer cases, 
which bring to mind the application of the Confucian principle “ren” (仁, “humanity”). 
Ultimately, it is vital that the final solution be  “fair” (公平, gongping) and “reasonable” (合
理, heli). 
The foregoing discussion echoes the ancient motto of the Yangwu Movement, 
“Chinese learning for substance; Western learning for application” (中学为体 ,  西学为
用  zhong xue wei ti, x i  xue wei yong). This aspect, while perhaps not warranting excessive 
emphasis, is certainly worthy of further consideration. 
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